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Property Rights in cDNA Sequences:
A New Resident for the Public Domain
RICHARD A. EPSTEINt
Professor Rebecca Eisenberg has provided us with an exhaustive and useful
account of the recent dispute over patent protection for large-scale complemen-
tary DNA ("cDNA") sequencing.' Stripped to its essentials, the dispute arose
as follows. Scientists at the National Institute of Neurological Diseases and
Stroke developed the initial techniques for the discovery of cDNA sequences
and the ability to isolate certain "expressed sequence tags" ("ESTs") within the
cDNA sequences. These gene tags permit investigators to identify the larger
active DNA strands of which they are a part and provide information that
might be used to develop drugs and other end products that, if successful,
could command a handsome return in the marketplace.
No one doubts, I think, that any novel processes used to isolate these gene
tags are entitled to receive patent protection. But researchers also sought patent
protection for the non-"junk DNA" tags themselves, even though their exact
functions were not clearly established. In the end, these patent applications
were rejected.2 Our post mortem, therefore, must consider the implications of
this incident for future applications.
While I make no strong claim to expertise on patent law, I yield to no one
in my enthusiasm for the institution of private property. Notwithstanding the
latter and perhaps because of the former, I am puzzled as to why Professor
Eisenberg hesitates to condemn these claims. I can hardly conceive of a weaker
case for patent protection than this one. To outline the reasoning behind this
conclusion, I shall divide my response into two parts. Part I gives a quick
overview of the rules governing the acquisition of property rights both in
things and inventions. Part II applies the principles behind property rights to
the cDNA dispute.
tRichard A. Epstein is the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law at the
University of Chicago Law School.
1. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Intellectual Property at the Public Private Divide: The
Case of Large-Scale cDNA Sequencing, 3 U Chi L Sch Roundtable 557 (1996).
2. See id at 563; James Boyle, Shamans, Software and Spleens 9 (Harvard 1996).
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I. Property and Patents
The common law rules governing private property made no provision for
patents, but were keyed to the protection of a specific thing that was found by
the defendant and was otherwise unowned. The rules applied both to land and
to movables, such as driftwood on the beach. The law allowed for the capture
of the unowned fox on a barren beach in Pierson v Post.3 But in all cases the
payoff was limited. The first possessor took the ownership of the particular
tangible thing-period. The classical writers on property delighted in the rule
because they believed that everything deserves, or at least needs, an owner.4
By assigning that right to the first possessor, the law makes it clear who can
farm the land, carve the wood, or skin the fox-no small advantages. But for
animals, the rule that firmed up property rights in the individual animal
allowed the species to be hunted to extinction. Therefore, other collective lim-
its had to be devised and were.' The first possession rule had its limits as well
as its uses.
Moreover, the first possession rule functions fitfully with respect to
property rights in ideas. For example, it protects the owner of the first
telephone, which is fine, but does not give the inventor the exclusive right to
produce telephones, which is not so fine. The first possession rule ignores the
fact that the payoff from research and development comes not in the owner-
ship of the specific thing, but in the use of the key ideas and plans to produce
a line of similar products. The common law rules of first possession allow
anyone to assemble the needed materials and to make telephones identical to
those produced by the original inventor. Free riding on the investor's research
and development costs, the subsequent producer of telephones will likely sell
telephones at a lower price. Facing that threat, the original inventor may well
withdraw from the field if he knows that his first customer could become his
victorious low-cost competitor. To prevent this result, patent law protects the
investor against the use of his invention by others. No longer are property
rights embedded solely in the tangible objects to which the common law rules
assign owners. Instead, the property rights conferred by patent law extend to
classes of things, present and future, that fall within the scope of the patent.
Unfortunately, it is much more difficult to define the scope of a patent than
the boundaries of a parcel of land, the confines of a piece of wood, or the
body of a fox. So just how broad should a patent be?
In dealing with the acquisition of physical objects, the social considerations
that lurk behind the definition of property rights are not called into high relief.
3. 3 Cai R 175 (NY 1805).
4. "Its true basis [of the priority for the first possessor] seems to be, not an
instinctive bias towards the institution of Property, but a presumption, arising out of the
long continuance of that institution, that everything ought to have an owner." Henry S.
Maine, Ancient Law 257-58 (Murray 12th ed 1888).
5. For the now classic exposition on the origin of trapping territories, see Harold
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am Econ Rev 347, 352, 353 (1967).
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It is sensible enough to assign to one person exclusive and perpetual rights
when a specific piece of land, a specific chattel, or a specific wild animal is at
stake. The old maxim that "only he who sows shall reap" recognizes the
obvious truth that a crop can be harvested only once. So, the right to harvest
has to be assigned to the party who planted the crop, if planting is to take
place at all. Similarly, a given animal can be captured and used but once. As
a result, the incentives for its capture and use are best situated, so long as
overhunting is combated in some other fashion, if that right belongs to the
party who reduced the animal to possession in the first place.
With patents, on the other hand, the calculation is far trickier. Just
because it is imperative to give the inventor of the telephone protection that
goes beyond the specific telephone he makes, it hardly follows that his patent
protection should be infinite either in scope or duration for all telephones
however and whenever designed. Some protection of exclusive rights after
invention, at the back end of the process, seems necessary to create incentives
for spurring inventions and discoveries at the front end. In this context,
however, exclusivity comes at a far higher price because others who could use
this idea profitably for nothing are now required to defer their use to the
holder of the patent monopoly. The basic social choice is strictly functional
and instrumental. We must decide whether the incentives for the creation of
these inventions and discoveries are large enough to justify the restrictions on
output that follow when rights over invention or discovery are vested exclu-
sively in the inventor and discoverer.
While there is widespread agreement in the literature about the imperative
necessity of making this tradeoff, there is far less agreement as to how to
make it. Theorists on the patent law form a mysterious and inveterate set of
fine-tuners, who argue constantly about the size of the trade-offs in particular
contexts. They attempt to achieve a balance where the extent of protection is
sufficient to spur the first round of invention without unduly dulling the
second.
The problem is further complicated because there are no legal rules that
require individuals to patent their inventions once they are made. As the wRord
"patent" itself suggests, the patent is patent (with a long "a"), as opposed to
latent. The particulars of the invention must be disclosed in full in order to
receive legal protection. Yet individuals who have developed certain processes
to produce standard goods often do not want to publish the details of their
inventions because others could build the suitable apparatus themselves and sell
their standardized output at low prices without ever disclosing that their
activity infringes the patent of another. To forestall this result, some inventors
prefer to keep their inventions secret. These trade secrets are then disclosed
only to those individuals who agree by contract to use the invention solely for
limited purposes and not to disclose its key features to others. Therefore, one
cost of supplying insufficient patent protection is to encourage an excessive
migration into trade secrets, which are of indefinite duration, so long as the
secret can be kept.
1996]
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II. The cDNA Dispute
I am in no position to hazard a responsible guess as to the optimal scope
and length of patent protection in some hypothetical generic case. But I do
have a strong reaction about the prospect of patent protection for cDNA
sequences. Try as I might, I cannot comprehend how these applications could
have been regarded as giving rise to a respectable case for patent protection.
Rather, this controversy seems to present an oasis of simplicity surrounded by
a sea of doubt. Professor Eisenberg presents us with a taut narrative that treats
the correct resolution of the dispute as a close matter, but she never quite
gives us her bottom line. Not being an expert in the area, I am not so bashful.
It is hard to conceive of a weaker case for patent protection than these cDNA
tags. The scope of the claimed protection is enormous. It is quite literally as
though the hunter who bagged the first fox gets an exclusive right to capture
every member of the species. However, the logic of extending cDNA tags such
expansive protection is just not there. For example, as Eisenberg reports,
Merck & Co., Inc., which is no stranger to the patent wars, has provided an
extensive fund to Washington University in St. Louis in order to help pay for
the production of cDNA tags that will be immediately placed in the public
domain. Other private institutions, including universities, also appear to be
willing to chip in to help cover the costs of these enterprises.6 This collective
enterprise may well be fraught with some risk, for if the patent applications of
the private firms, Human Genome Sciences and Incyte Pharmaceuticals, are
ever granted, then this public database would infringe the patent. Both the
parties who have assembled the database and those who have used it could be
liable. The ensuing legal snarls promise handsome annuities to patent lawyers
and their squads of expert witnesses and could only slow down the research
process that depends on access to this database.
So why tolerate the patent? Within the logic of the patent tradition, the
only possible explanation for this untoward development is that exclusion is
part of the regrettable cost of new discoveries. In this context, however, no
society should make so lopsided a bargain or be presumed to have made one
by allowing for generalized patent protection. The cDNA sequences are not
some hidden secret. Right now many research groups and firms are out to
discover them. So long as at least one group is prepared to place its discov-
eries in the public domain, and to do so at a rapid rate, then why use the
patent laws to secure innovation? It is not as though the private companies are
fashioning some new bacteria or virus with commercial application, as was the
situation in Diamond v Cbakrabarty.7 In that case, patent protection was
accorded, rightly in my view, for the creation of a new organism not found in
nature! In the present imbroglio, we have all the inconveniences of exclusion
6. See Eisenberg, 3 U Chi L Sch Roundtable at 569-70 (cited in note 1).
7. 447 US 303 (1980).
8. Id at 313 ("Congress thus recognized that the relevant distinction was not between
living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and
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at the back end, without any of the compensating social advantages of
innovation at the front end. Instead of allowing the uncertainty to place a pall
over innovation, the sensible course of action is to categorically reject any and
all applications for patent protection.
Then, the line between the public and private domain will continue to
shift, but only in desirable ways. Individual firms can still treat the cDNA
sequences they discover as trade secrets. They can sell their wares to private
buyers, subject to suitable covenants against public disclosure. In undertaking
these sales or licenses, they can make the appropriate business judgments about
whether the use of their cDNA sequences should be given on a exclusive or
nonexclusive basis. They can decide on whether to take their compensation in
a lump sum, by royalty, or both. Also, they can select whatever information
sharing arrangements they desire. No one in the public sector need decide
which of these business arrangements are desirable and which are not, for the
firms are quite able to do this by themselves. The public list of cDNA se-
quences, supported by Merck and others, will still remain available to the
world and will compete with trade secret arrangements. Whether these private
firms can survive is hard to say, but the rapid collection, compilation and
organization of the data might well continue to justify the hefty sums collected
today.
In some sense, none of this matters at all. If private firms cannot add
value to the library of cDNA sequences, then their efforts should cease or be
redirected toward using the publicly available cDNA sequences to make
patentable products. Professor Eisenberg is right to observe that it is odd, to
say the least, for the NIH, as a public agency, to argue for patentability, while
Merck, a private firm, pays cash on the barrelhead to keep cDNA sequences
in the public domain." But irony is not our major concern. The key inquiry
concerns the soundness of our basic institutional arrangements in light of the
moves that private partieg have made and are likely to make again in the
future. I can see no reason to award any form of patent protection to the
firms that first discover some critical cDNA sequences. If we grant patents for
the discovery of cDNA tags, we might as well say that Madame Curie should
be entitled to a patent for radium since she first isolated it from pitchblende.
Quite simply, the cDNA sequences belong in the public domain.
human-made inventions.").
9. Eisenberg, 3 U Chi L Sch Roundtable at 561 (cited in note 1).
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